The Network Associates PGP Keyserver contains vulnerabilities that may allow denial-of-service attacks, unauthorized privileged access, or both. These vulnerabilities were revealed using the PROTOS LDAPv3 test suite and are documented in CERT Advisory CA-2001-18. If your site uses this product, the CERT/CC encourages you to follow the advice provided below.
The Network Associates PGP Keyserver 7.0 contains multiple vulnerabilities in the code that processes LDAP requests.
In the encoding section of the test suite, this product failed 12 of 16 groups.
In the application section of the test suite, this product failed 1 of 77 groups. The failed group focused on out-of-bounds integer values for the messageID parameter. Due to a peculiarity of this test group, this failure may actually represent an encoding failure.
One or more of these vulnerabilities allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the Keyserver. The server typically runs with system privileges. At least one of these vulnerabilities has been successfully exploited in a laboratory environment.
Apply a patch from your vendor
Please consult the Systems Affected section for vendor-specific information on addressing this vulnerability.
Block access to directory services at network perimeter
As a temporary measure, it is possible to limit the scope of these vulnerabilities by blocking access to directory services at the network perimeter. Please note that this workaround does not protect vulnerable products from internal attacks.
ldap 389/tcp # Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
ldap 389/udp # Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
ldaps 636/tcp # ldap protocol over TLS/SSL (was sldap)
ldaps 636/udp # ldap protocol over TLS/SSL (was sldap)
Vendor| Status| Date Notified| Date Updated
Network Associates| | 06 Apr 2001| 16 Jul 2001
If you are a vendor and your product is affected, let us know.
Group | Score | Vector
Base | N/A | N/A
Temporal | N/A | N/A
Environmental | N/A | N/A
The CERT Coordination Center thanks the Oulu University Secure Programming Group for reporting these vulnerabilities to us, for their detailed technical analyses, and for their assistance in preparing this document.
This document was written by Jeffrey P. Lanza.