EMC Legato NetWorker uses weak AUTH_UNIX authentication

2005-08-16T00:00:00
ID VU:606857
Type cert
Reporter CERT
Modified 2005-10-04T18:42:00

Description

Overview

EMC Legato NetWorker uses weak AUTH_UNIX authentication, allowing a remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands, gain elevated privileges, or cause a denial of service.

Description

EMC Legato NetWorker is a cross-platform backup and recovery application. It is also repackaged by Sun Microsystems as Solstice Backup and StorEdge Enterprise Backup, by FSC as Fujitsu Siemens Computers' NetWorker, by NEC as WebSAM NetWorker Powered by Legato, and by Fujitsu as NetWorker.

NetWorker authentication

NetWorker uses the AUTH_UNIX authentication mechanism (a client-based security option) for its RPC service. This means the NetWorker software trusts that the remote system calling its RPC interface has already authenticated the remote client process via standard UNIX user id mechanisms (i.e., if a daemon only allows UID 0 [root] access to its RPC interface, it trusts remote RPC clients to be running with UID 0 [root] privileges).

NetWorker components

nwadmin and nsradmin are the administrative utilities for NetWorker. They can be used to view or modify the configuration of a NetWorker server. The NetWorker server grants administrative access based on an administrators list. nwadmin and nsradmin use getpwuid_r(getuid()) to determine the invoking user's name.

nsrports is used to specify the port ranges used by the NetWorker software. nsrports allows any user with an apparent username of "root" to set NetWorker port ranges.

The recover program is used to restore files that were backed up using the NetWorker software. recover determines what files may be accessed based on the UID of the user that calls the process.

nsrexec and nsrexecd are NetWorker components that provide functionality similar to rsh. nsrexec is a command that runs on the NetWorker server to send commands to the client systems. nsrexecd is a service that runs on the NetWorker client systems. nsrexecd executes commands on the client system that it receives from the NetWorker server. The combination of nsrexec and nsrexecd is what allows the NetWorker server to execute commands on the client remotely, such as initiating a backup process. The nsrexecd service uses RPC AUTH_UNIX to determine the identity of the user who will run the backup command.

The problem

The authentication mechanisms used by the various NetWorker components are weak. AUTH_UNIX authentication does not provide sufficient protection against attacks because it relies solely on the authentication credentials provided by the client. An attacker can spoof the user name to bypass the authentication mechanism used by nwadmin, nsradmin, and nsrports. An attacker can spoof the UID to bypass the authentication mechanism used by recover and nsrexecd.


Impact

A remote unauthenticated attacker may take any of the following actions:

* Execute arbitrary commands on a NetWorker client system
* View or modify the configuration of the NetWorker server
* Cause a denial-of-service condition by altering the ports used by NetWorker
* View files backed up by any other NetWorker client, regardless of file permissions

A local user may be able to gain elevated privileges on a system running NetWorker.

Solution

Apply a patch or upgrade
Apply a patch or upgrade, as specified in the EMC Legato Technical Product Alert.

Sun Solstice Backup and StorEdge Enterprise Backup customers should see Sun Alert 101866 for patch availability.


Restrict access

You may wish to block access to the vulnerable software from outside your network perimeter, specifically by blocking access to the ports used by NetWorker (typically TCP and UDP ports 7937-9936). This will limit your exposure to attacks. However, blocking at the network perimeter would still allow attackers within the perimeter of your network to exploit the vulnerability. The use of host-based firewalls in addition to network-based firewalls can help restrict access to specific hosts within the network. It is important to understand your network's configuration and service requirements before deciding what changes are appropriate.


Vendor Information

606857

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EMC Software

Notified: January 14, 2005 Updated: August 16, 2005

Status

__ Vulnerable

Vendor Statement

EMC has created - and made available to customers - a set of
guidelines and software patch to better protect against the
vulnerability identified in this advisory. The full guidelines are
available at:
<http://www.legato.com/support/websupport/product_alerts/081605_NW_authentication.htm>
An integrated resolution to this vulnerability will
be available in the next release of EMC Legato NetWorker, which is
planned to be generally available in Q4 of 2005.

Vendor Information

The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.

Addendum

US-CERT has no additional comments at this time.

If you have feedback, comments, or additional information about this vulnerability, please send us email.

__ Fujitsu Limited

Notified: August 15, 2005 Updated: August 24, 2005

Status

__ Vulnerable

Vendor Statement

No statement is currently available from the vendor regarding this vulnerability.

Vendor Information

The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.

__ NEC

Notified: August 15, 2005 Updated: August 24, 2005

Status

__ Vulnerable

Vendor Statement

No statement is currently available from the vendor regarding this vulnerability.

Vendor Information

The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.

Sun Microsystems, Inc.

Notified: July 12, 2005 Updated: September 19, 2005

Status

__ Vulnerable

Vendor Statement

Sun repackages the Legato Networker product as Sun StorEdge Enterprise Backup, and is affected by the vulnerability described in CERT VU#606857. Sun has published Sun Alert 101866 which is available here:

<http://sunsolve.sun.com/search/document.do?assetkey=1-26-101886-1>

for this issue.

The Sun Alert contains details of patches which have been released for StorEdge Enterprise Backup version 7.1 and StorEdge Enterprise Backup version 7.2, which address this issue.

Vendor Information

The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.

CVSS Metrics

Group | Score | Vector
---|---|---
Base | N/A | N/A
Temporal | N/A | N/A
Environmental | | N/A

References

  • <http://www.legato.com/support/websupport/product_alerts/081605_NW-7x.htm>
  • <http://www.legato.com/support/websupport/product_alerts/081605_NW_authentication.htm>
  • <http://sunsolve.sun.com/search/document.do?assetkey=1-26-101886-1>
  • <http://www.legato.com/support/websupport/tech_bulletins/?includefile=388.html>
  • <http://www.legato.com/products/networker/>
  • <http://secunia.com/advisories/16464/>
  • <http://secunia.com/advisories/16470/>
  • <http://www.cnn.com/2005/TECH/internet/07/25/hackers.backup.software.reut/index.html>

Acknowledgements

Thanks to the NOAA NCIRT Lab for reporting this vulnerability.

This document was written by Will Dormann.

Other Information

CVE IDs: | CVE-2005-0357
---|---
Severity Metric:** | 12.07
Date Public:
| 2005-08-16
Date First Published: | 2005-08-16
Date Last Updated: | 2005-10-04 18:42 UTC
Document Revision: | 53