10 High
CVSS2
Attack Vector
NETWORK
Attack Complexity
LOW
Authentication
NONE
Confidentiality Impact
COMPLETE
Integrity Impact
COMPLETE
Availability Impact
COMPLETE
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
0.515 Medium
EPSS
Percentile
97.6%
Some products based on VxWorks have the WDB target agent debug service enabled by default. This service provides read/write access to the deviceβs memory and allows functions to be called.
The VxWorks WDB target agent is a target-resident, run-time facility that is required for connecting host tools to a VxWorks target system during development. WDB is a selectable component in the VxWorks configuration and is enabled by default. The WDB debug agent access is not secured and does provide a security hole in a deployed system.
It is advisable for production systems to reconfigure VxWorks with only those components needed for deployed operation and to build it as the appropriate type of system image. It is recommended to remove host development components such as the WDB target agent and debugging components (INCLUDE_WDB and INCLUDE_DEBUG) as well as other operating system components that are not required to support customer applications.
Consult the VxWorks Kernel Programmerβs guide for more information on WDB.
Additional information can be found in ICS-CERT advisory ICSA-10-214-01 and on the Metasploit Blog.
An attacker can use the debug service to fully compromise the device.
Vendors should remove the WDB target debug agent in their VxWorks based products by removing the INCLUDE_WDB & INCLUDE_DEBUG components from their VxWorks Image.
Appropriate firewall rules should be implemented to restrict access to the debug service (17185/udp) to only trusted sources until vendors have released patches to disable it.
Thanks to HD Moore for reporting a wider scope with additional research related to this vulnerability. Earlier public reports came from Bennett Todd and Shawn Merdinger.
This document was written by Jared Allar.
362332
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Notified: 2010-06-14 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-18 Updated: 2020-08-31
Statement Date: January 20, 2011
CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
The following products have been reported to be affected: ARRIS C3β’ Cable Modem Termination System Firmware Release <=4.4.4.13
Notified: 2010-06-29 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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Notified: 2010-06-14 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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Notified: 2010-06-29 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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Notified: 2010-06-29 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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Notified: 2010-06-29 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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Notified: 2010-06-14 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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Notified: 2010-06-14 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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Notified: 2010-06-14 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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Notified: 2010-06-29 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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Notified: 2010-06-14 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-14 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-14 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-14 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-29 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-29 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-29 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-18 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-14 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-14 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-14 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-29 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-29 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-14 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Updated: 2020-08-31
Statement Date: June 18, 2010
CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-29 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-29 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-29 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-14 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-29 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-29 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-14 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-14 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-18 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-18 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-14 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-14 Updated: 2020-08-31
Statement Date: December 07, 2010
CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
The release notes for SoundPoint IP/SoundStation IP SIP software states that version 3.1.2 has closed the debug port. β47450: Port 17185 is open, presenting a security riskβ http://downloads.polycom.com/voice/voip/relnotes/spip_ssip_v3_1_6_Legacy_release_notes.pdf
Notified: 2010-06-14 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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Notified: 2010-06-14 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-14 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-15 Updated: 2020-08-31
Statement Date: June 29, 2010
CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Rockwell Automation 1756-ENBT series A running firmware versions 3.2.6 and 3.6.1 are vulnerable. Please see Rockwell Automation Technote 69735 for more information.
Notified: 2010-06-18 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
newsoft reports that the SFR (formerly Neuf Cegetel and Neuf Telecom) Trio3C has the debug service enabled.
Notified: 2010-06-18 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
The Modicon M340 with firmware version 2.5 was reported to run VxWorks 6.4 and have the debug port enabled.
Notified: 2010-06-14 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-14 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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Security Advisory Report - OBSO-1010-01 Enabled VxWorks debug service Creation Date: 2010-10-15 Last Update: 2010-10-15 Summary A security researcher has identified a large number of products based on the VxWorks platform provided by Wind River Systems with a debug service enabled by default at port 17185/udp. Vulnerability Details The debug service provides full access to the memory of an affected device and allows for memory to be written as well as functions to be called. Of the various products based on VxWorks, the following are not affected by this vulnerability: HiPath Wireless Convergence, RG 8700, optiPoint 410/420 SIP and HFA (V5). Affected Products HiPath 3000 (HG 1500 Gateway) HiPath 4000 (HG 35xx Gateway) optiPoint 410/420 HFA, versions before V5 optiPoint 600 office Recommended Actions In general, it is recommended not to attach the mentioned systems directly at the internet. Appropriate firewall rules should be implemented to restrict access to the debug service (17185/udp). The problem is solved in the following versions; an update to these or higher versions is highly recommended: HiPath 3000 V8: V8 R5.2.0 HiPath 4000 V4: V4 R4.1.12 HiPath 4000 V5: V5 R1.2.4 Please note: HiPath 3000 V7: You need to upgrade the HG 1500 gateway only. Please use V8 R5.2.0 for this. You may keep the system itself in V7. HiPath 3000 V6 and earlier have reached end of SW support; please consider an upgrade to V7 or V8 HiPath 4000 V3 and earlier have reached end of SW support; please consider an upgrade to V4 or higher. Some older, unsupported versions of optiPoint 410/420 HFA IP phones are also vulnerable. Please ensure, that V5 is installed on all phones. optiPoint 600 office has reached end of life since a few years already; an update is unfortunately not available References https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2010-2965 http://blog.metasploit.com/2010/08/vxworks-vulnerabilities.html http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/362332 Revision History 2010-10-15 Initial release Contact and Disclaimer OpenScale Baseline Security Office [email protected] Β© Siemens Enterprise Communications GmbH & Co KG 2010 Siemens Enterprise Communications GmbH & Co. KG is a Trademark Licensee of Siemens AG The information provided in this document is subject to change without notice. Siemens Enterpise Communications GmbH & Co KG (SEN) assumes no responsibility for any errors that may appear in this document, and it does not affect your current support agreements with SEN. Any trademarks referenced in this document are the property of their respective owners. βEnd Vendor Statement-------------------------------------------------------------------
The vendor provided the above advisory information for their affected products.
Notified: 2010-06-14 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-18 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-14 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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Wind River has analyzed VU#362332, and determined that all versions of VxWorks could be vulnerable if the WDB agent is left enabled in production systems and the system is network attached. VxWorks has a very strong track record of offering secure products and Wind River is committed to active threat monitoring, rapid assessment, threat prioritization, expedited remediation, response and proactive customer contact. Customers are encouraged to follow the remediation actions outlined in the SOLUTION section of the vulnerability post. Registered users can access Wind Riverβs online support for more information by following this link: https://support.windriver.com/olsPortal/faces/maintenance/downloadDetails.jspx?contentId=033708 Or contact Wind River technical support for more information: http://windriver.com/support/
Within the VxWorks Kernel programmers guide it states: βFor production systems, you will want to reconfigure VxWorks with only those components needed for deployed operation, and to build it as the appropriate type of system image. You will likely want to remove components required for host development support, such as the WDB target agent and debugging components (INCLUDE_WDB and INCLUDE_DEBUG), as well as to remove any other operating system components not required to support your application. Other considerations may include reducing the memory requirements of the system, speeding up boot time, and security issues.β
Notified: 2010-06-14 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-29 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-06-18 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Not Affected |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-08-03 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Unknown |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Notified: 2010-07-02 Updated: 2020-08-31 CVE-2010-2965 | Unknown |
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We have not received a statement from the vendor.
View all 56 vendors __View less vendors __
Group | Score | Vector |
---|---|---|
Base | 10 | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C |
Temporal | 9.5 | E:H/RL:W/RC:C |
Environmental | 9.5 | CDP:ND/TD:H/CR:ND/IR:ND/AR:ND |
CVE IDs: | CVE-2010-2965 |
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Date Public: | 2010-08-02 Date First Published: |
blogs.windriver.com/chauhan/2010/08/vxworks-secure.html
cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/215.html
cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/505.html
seclists.org/vuln-dev/2002/May/179
thesauceofutterpwnage.blogspot.com/2010/08/metasploit-vxworks-wdb-agent-attack.html
www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20051116-7920.shtml
www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/pdf/ICSA-10-214-01_VxWorks_Vulnerabilities.pdf
community.rapid7.com/community/metasploit/blog/2010/08/02/shiny-old-vxworks-vulnerabilities
support.windriver.com/olsPortal/faces/maintenance/downloadDetails.jspx?contentId=033708