10 High
CVSS2
Access Vector
NETWORK
Access Complexity
LOW
Authentication
NONE
Confidentiality Impact
COMPLETE
Integrity Impact
COMPLETE
Availability Impact
COMPLETE
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Use-after-free vulnerability in the ByteArray class in the ActionScript 3 (AS3) implementation in Adobe Flash Player 13.x through 13.0.0.296 and 14.x through 18.0.0.194 on Windows and OS X and 11.x through 11.2.202.468 on Linux allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via crafted Flash content that overrides a valueOf function, as exploited in the wild in July 2015.
Recent assessments:
wchen-r7 at September 12, 2019 6:07pm UTC reported:
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adobe_Flash_Player>
Congrats! You are reading about the most beautiful Flash bug for the last four
years since CVE-2010-2161.
The use-after-free vulnerability exists inside the built-in ByteArray class
<http://help.adobe.com/en_US/FlashPlatform/reference/actionscript/3/flash/utils/ByteArray.html>
Letโs create a simple ByteArray object:
var ba:ByteArray = new ByteArray();
ba.length = 8;
ba[1] = 1;
Now we can access ba[] items and write numeric byte values into ba[].
Also we are allowed to write objects into ByteArray. For example:
var obj = new MyClass();
ba[0] = obj;
AS3 will try to implicitly convert the MyClass object into numeric value by
calling the MyClass.valueOf() method. This method can be easily redefined
within the userโs code:
class MyClass
{
prototype.valueOf = function()
{
ba.length = 88; // reallocate ba[] storage
return 0; // return byte for ba[offset]
}
}
Letโs see how that implicit conversion occurs inside the native code:
push esi
mov eax, [esp+8] // the offset value from "ba[offset] = obj"
push eax
add ecx, 0x18 // ecx = this = "ba" object pointer
call ByteArray.getStorage() // gets ba[offset] storage pointer and
mov esi, eax // saves it in esi
mov ecx, [esp+0xC] // "obj" pointer
push ecx
call AvmCore.toInteger() // call MyClass.valueOf()
add esp,4
mov [esi], al // writes returned byte into array
pop esi
ret 8
On high-level language this will look like:
void ByteArray.setObjInternal(int offset, obj)
{
byte* dest = this.getStorage(offset);
dest* = toInteger(obj);
}
So the array storage pointer is saved in local variable, then AS3 valueOf() is
invoked from the native code and returned byte is written into destination
pointer at the end. If valueOf() changes the length of byte array (see above)
and reallocates its internal storage, then local destination pointer becomes
obsolete and further usage of that pointer can lead to UaF memory corruption.
Using this vulnerability, itโs very easy to control what byte will be written
and at which offset this corruption will occur.
AFFECTED SOFTWARE
Adobe Flash Player 9 and higher
TESTING
Open the test โcalc.htmโ file in your browser and press the button.
on Windows:
Calc.exe should be popped on desktop IE.
Calc.exe should be run as a non-GUI child process in metro IE.
Payload returns 0 from CreateProcessA(โcalc.exeโ) inside Chrome/FF sandbox.
on OS X:
Calculator is launched in FF or standalone Flash Player projector.
Payload returns 1 from vfork() in Safari sandbox.
Assessed Attacker Value: 0
Assessed Attacker Value: 0Assessed Attacker Value: 0