Nuuo Central Management Server allows authenticated users to download files. A directory traversal flaw in the FileType header allows the user to specify a file outside of the intended directories to download.
Recent assessments:
jrobles-r7 at May 09, 2019 5:57pm UTC reported:
Details from module documentation in Metasploit.
The GETCONFIG verb is used by a CMS client to obtain configuration files and other resources from the CMS server. An example request is below:
GETCONFIG NUCM/1.0
FileName: <filename>
FileType: <number>
User-Session-No: <session-number>
The FileType determines the directory where the file will be downloaded from. “FileType: 0” will download from the base installation directory (CMS_DIR), while “FileType: 1” will download from “<CMS_DIR>
\Images\Map\”. There are other defined FileType integers, but these have not been investigated in detail.
The vulnerability is in the “FileName” parameter, which accepts directory traversal (…\…\) characters. Therefore, this function can be abused to obtain any files off the file system, including:
CMServer.cfg, a file zipped with the password “NUCMS2007!” that contains the usernames and passwords of all the system users (enabling a less privileged user to obtain the administrator’s password)
ServerConfig.cfg, another file zipped with the password “NUCMS2007!” that contains the SQL Server “sa” password as well the FTP server username and password
Any other sensitive files in the drive where CMS Server is installed.
This module works in the following way:
if a SESSION number is present, uses that to login
if not, tries to authenticate with USERNAME and PASSWORD
Due to the lack of ZIP encryption support in Metasploit, the module prints a warning indicating that the archive cannot be unzipped in Msf.
Assessed Attacker Value: 3
Assessed Attacker Value: 3Assessed Attacker Value: 2