9.1 High
CVSS3
Attack Vector
NETWORK
Attack Complexity
LOW
Privileges Required
NONE
User Interaction
NONE
Scope
UNCHANGED
Confidentiality Impact
HIGH
Integrity Impact
HIGH
Availability Impact
NONE
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
8.8 High
CVSS2
Access Vector
NETWORK
Access Complexity
MEDIUM
Authentication
NONE
Confidentiality Impact
COMPLETE
Integrity Impact
COMPLETE
Availability Impact
NONE
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:N
A vulnerability in the High Availability (HA) service of Cisco Smart Software Manager On-Prem could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to access a sensitive part of the system with a high-privileged account. The vulnerability is due to a system account that has a default and static password and is not under the control of the system administrator. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by using this default account to connect to the affected system. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to obtain read and write access to system data, including the configuration of an affected device. The attacker would gain access to a sensitive portion of the system, but the attacker would not have full administrative rights to control the device.
Recent assessments:
busterb at February 20, 2020 6:29pm UTC reported:
It looks like the base software is installed as part of a Centos 7 system. Customizations are found in the โhardeningโ directory on the installer ISO file.
atlantis-post-install.sh looks interesting, as it sets up all of the services and unpacks the custom file satellite-install.tgz
Hasty diff between 201910 and 202001
$ diff -u /mnt/hardening/atlantis-post-install.sh atlantis-post-install.sh
--- /mnt/hardening/atlantis-post-install.sh 2019-11-20 13:01:24.000000000 -0600
+++ atlantis-post-install.sh 2020-01-29 22:03:41.000000000 -0600
@@ -68,7 +68,8 @@
firewall-offline-cmd --zone=user --add-service=ssh
firewall-offline-cmd --zone=user --add-rich-rule='rule family=ipv4 port port=443 protocol=tcp reject'
firewall-offline-cmd --zone=user --add-rich-rule='rule family=ipv6 port port=443 protocol=tcp reject'
-# dmz zone already exists
+# dmz zone already exists (ssh service is inherited - we remopve it here)
+firewall-offline-cmd --zone=dmz --remove-service-from-zone=ssh
firewall-offline-cmd --zone=dmz --add-rich-rule='rule family=ipv4 port port=80 protocol=tcp reject'
firewall-offline-cmd --zone=dmz --add-rich-rule='rule family=ipv4 port port=443 protocol=tcp reject'
firewall-offline-cmd --zone=dmz --add-rich-rule='rule family=ipv4 port port=8443 protocol=tcp reject'
Interestingly the docker layers that appear to be part of the build leak a number of internal Cisco resource names:
curl http://timaeus.cisco.com/devKey \u003e ~/.ssh/id_rsa \u0026\u0026 chmod 0600 ~/.ssh/id_rsa \u0026\u0026 eval `ssh-agent` \u0026\u0026 ssh-add \u0026\u0026 ssh-keyscan -p 7999 -t rsa bitbucket-eng-sjc1.cisco.com \u003e\u003e ~/.ssh/known_hosts \u0026\u0026 bundle install --with cerberus --without development test alpha \u0026\u0026 rm -rf ~/.ssh \u0026\u0026 bundle config --global frozen 1;"},{"created":"2019-11-21T05:24:36.571974064Z","created_by":"|0 /bin/sh -c sed -i '/jessie-updates main/d' /etc/apt/sources.list"},{"created":"2019-11-21T05:26:54.698408023Z","created_by":"|0 /bin/sh -c apt-get update \u0026\u0026 apt-get install -y postgresql-client"},{"created":"2019-11-21T05:26:55.987328112Z","created_by":"|0 /bin/sh -c ln -sf /dev/stdout /usr/src/log/sidekiq.log"},{"created":"2019-11-21T05:26:56.230921929Z","created_by":"/bin/sh -c #(nop) COPY file:31a545d2f5f434f3e031ea7c4fd4af19d67f5fb40e217c1ed1ef665da663abce in /usr/local/bin/ "},{"created":"2019-11-21T05:26:56.391769508Z","created_by":"/bin/sh -c #(nop) CMD [\"/bin/sh\" \"-c\" \"/bin/bash /usr/local/bin/startup.sh\"]","empty_layer":true}],"os":"linux","rootfs":{"type":"layers","diff_ids":[
Other internal creds seem to be baked into the app as well, even in the current version. This app looks worthy of future explorations, especially for the other secrets it contains. Iโm just not sure how much install footprint it has in the real world, at least Iโve never worked for a company that would be the target market for this app.
cdelafuente-r7 at February 28, 2020 2:29pm UTC reported:
It looks like the base software is installed as part of a Centos 7 system. Customizations are found in the โhardeningโ directory on the installer ISO file.
atlantis-post-install.sh looks interesting, as it sets up all of the services and unpacks the custom file satellite-install.tgz
Hasty diff between 201910 and 202001
$ diff -u /mnt/hardening/atlantis-post-install.sh atlantis-post-install.sh
--- /mnt/hardening/atlantis-post-install.sh 2019-11-20 13:01:24.000000000 -0600
+++ atlantis-post-install.sh 2020-01-29 22:03:41.000000000 -0600
@@ -68,7 +68,8 @@
firewall-offline-cmd --zone=user --add-service=ssh
firewall-offline-cmd --zone=user --add-rich-rule='rule family=ipv4 port port=443 protocol=tcp reject'
firewall-offline-cmd --zone=user --add-rich-rule='rule family=ipv6 port port=443 protocol=tcp reject'
-# dmz zone already exists
+# dmz zone already exists (ssh service is inherited - we remopve it here)
+firewall-offline-cmd --zone=dmz --remove-service-from-zone=ssh
firewall-offline-cmd --zone=dmz --add-rich-rule='rule family=ipv4 port port=80 protocol=tcp reject'
firewall-offline-cmd --zone=dmz --add-rich-rule='rule family=ipv4 port port=443 protocol=tcp reject'
firewall-offline-cmd --zone=dmz --add-rich-rule='rule family=ipv4 port port=8443 protocol=tcp reject'
Interestingly the docker layers that appear to be part of the build leak a number of internal Cisco resource names:
curl http://timaeus.cisco.com/devKey \u003e ~/.ssh/id_rsa \u0026\u0026 chmod 0600 ~/.ssh/id_rsa \u0026\u0026 eval `ssh-agent` \u0026\u0026 ssh-add \u0026\u0026 ssh-keyscan -p 7999 -t rsa bitbucket-eng-sjc1.cisco.com \u003e\u003e ~/.ssh/known_hosts \u0026\u0026 bundle install --with cerberus --without development test alpha \u0026\u0026 rm -rf ~/.ssh \u0026\u0026 bundle config --global frozen 1;"},{"created":"2019-11-21T05:24:36.571974064Z","created_by":"|0 /bin/sh -c sed -i '/jessie-updates main/d' /etc/apt/sources.list"},{"created":"2019-11-21T05:26:54.698408023Z","created_by":"|0 /bin/sh -c apt-get update \u0026\u0026 apt-get install -y postgresql-client"},{"created":"2019-11-21T05:26:55.987328112Z","created_by":"|0 /bin/sh -c ln -sf /dev/stdout /usr/src/log/sidekiq.log"},{"created":"2019-11-21T05:26:56.230921929Z","created_by":"/bin/sh -c #(nop) COPY file:31a545d2f5f434f3e031ea7c4fd4af19d67f5fb40e217c1ed1ef665da663abce in /usr/local/bin/ "},{"created":"2019-11-21T05:26:56.391769508Z","created_by":"/bin/sh -c #(nop) CMD [\"/bin/sh\" \"-c\" \"/bin/bash /usr/local/bin/startup.sh\"]","empty_layer":true}],"os":"linux","rootfs":{"type":"layers","diff_ids":[
Other internal creds seem to be baked into the app as well, even in the current version. This app looks worthy of future explorations, especially for the other secrets it contains. Iโm just not sure how much install footprint it has in the real world, at least Iโve never worked for a company that would be the target market for this app.
Assessed Attacker Value: 3
Assessed Attacker Value: 3Assessed Attacker Value: 4
9.1 High
CVSS3
Attack Vector
NETWORK
Attack Complexity
LOW
Privileges Required
NONE
User Interaction
NONE
Scope
UNCHANGED
Confidentiality Impact
HIGH
Integrity Impact
HIGH
Availability Impact
NONE
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
8.8 High
CVSS2
Access Vector
NETWORK
Access Complexity
MEDIUM
Authentication
NONE
Confidentiality Impact
COMPLETE
Integrity Impact
COMPLETE
Availability Impact
NONE
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:N